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Abstract 
　　Th roughout much of its modern history, the Japanese people have spent much time and eff ort in search of 
their identity. Despite the eff orts to defi ne and redefi ne themselves, they have suff ered from bouts of anxiety 
regarding their identity that has regularly culminated in identity crises. Th e focal point in the crisis of Japanese 
identity is whether modern Japan is a part of the Occident, or the Orient. Th is ambiguity began in the late 
nineteenth century, when Japan embarked on a frenzied path of Westernization to “escape from Asia.” Based on 
Erik Erikson’s psycho-historical approach, this article examines the reasons for the Japanese identity crisis and 
what modern Japan and Japanese intellectuals have done in response to this crisis. Th is article is divided into four 
sections. It begins with a description of identity crisis and ideology. Th e article then examines how the Japanese 
suff ered from serious inner crises and breakdowns during the Meiji years. Th e second section consists of a 
discussion about Japan’s embrace of the ideology of Pan-Asianism to resolve its identity crisis and to redefi ne its 
identity through Asian traditions and values. Th e third section takes a critical look at Pan-Asianism with its 
propensity for asserting Japanese power and superiority in Asia and its slogans that justify Japanese aggression in 
Asia. Th e fi nal section off ers some refl ections on major implications of Pan-Asianism for the future of Japanese 
identity. It is concluded that there will be continuous challenges for Japan to form new identities in the twenty-
fi rst century. 
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1. Introduction
　　Throughout much of modern history, the Japanese have spent a great deal of time and effort in 
search of their identity. As Katō Shūichi [1976: 8] the leading thinker of twentieth-century Japan, defi nes 
that if there is one enduring trait that characterizes the Japanese, “the Japanese are a people who continu-
ously and tirelessly ask who are the Japanese,” it is that the question “who are the Japanese” never dies out 
among them. It might be said, therefore, that the Japanese have always been very conscious of their 
national identity. To be conscious of one’s own nation is not bad; it is a virtue. However, what needs to be 
taken into consideration is Japan has suff ered from bouts of anxiety regarding its identity that regularly 
culminated in identity crisis. Despite their great eff orts to defi ne and redefi ne themselves, Japan seems to 
have failed to develop a stable and secure identity. It is likely that Japan has been frustrated with the diffi  -
culty of coming to terms with its identity problem.
　　Th ere has been considerable discussion of the crisis of Japanese identity. Th e central discussion of it 
is about whether modern Japan has been part of the West, or rather of Asia: “Japan vacillated between 
insisting on being not Asian at all, and declaring itself the epitome of Asianness” [McCormack 2001: 159]. 
In general, it has been argued that Japan has been neither fully Western nor fully Asian. Th is ambiguity 
of Japanese identity began in the late nineteenth century when Japan opened itself to the Western world, 
bringing to an end more than two centuries of seclusion, and embarked on a frenzied path of Westerniza-
tion and escape from Asia (Datsu-a ron). Indeed, when Japan faced the mighty Western powers and civi-
lization, establishing its secure identity in such a totally alien environment and a Darwinian struggle for 
survival was certainly a traumatic experience for Japanese. In the process of redefi ning its identity within 
the Western-referenced world order, Japan became plagued with an obsession with Westernization on the 
other hand, and it considered its Asian neighbors to be backward and to be cast off  on the one hand. Par-
adoxically, however, Japan’s both quest for Westernization and rejection of identifi cation with backward 
Asia became one of the most important sources of Japanese identity crisis.
　　Th is article is not so much in the conventional question of how modern Japanese identity crisis had 
occurred, but rather in the deeper and theoretically more important question of why identity crisis had 
occurred. Th e fact of modern Japanese identity crisis is not the issue of my article; explaining identity cri-
sis is what this article is all about. Th en, more importantly, the aim of this article examines what modern 
Japan was activated in response to the identity crisis, or what Japanese intellectuals stepped forward. 
Exclusive attention is paid to Pan-Asianism, which was once a remedy of the identity crisis of the Japa-
nese concerning their overindulgent Westernization and existence between Asia and the West. In order 
to answer why modern Japan’s identity crisis had taken place and what ideology Japanese intellectuals 
had in reserve, this article falls back upon Erik Erikson’s psycho-historical approach, particularly suited 
to the purpose of explaining modern Japan’s identity crisis and its response.
　　Th is article is structured in four sections. Th e article begins with a description of identity crisis and 
ideology. I draw the outlines of my subject from Erik Erikson’s psycho-historical approach of the relation 
between identity crisis and ideology. It then examines how seriously Japan’s pre-modern identity had 
been undermined by the all-out Westernization and escape from Asia of the Meiji years. It was during 
these years that Japanese were to suff er from inner crisis and breakdowns. Th is is followed by a discussion 
of Pan-Asianism as Japan’s ideology to resolve identity crisis. It is argued that Pan-Asianists provided 
foundation of Asian unity and regional identity so as to defi ne Japan’s identity in the conditions of the 
Asian tradition and value. Th e penultimate section provides a critical look at Pan-Asianism and views 
Pan-Asianism as ambiguous about a regional identity and unity because it had a propensity for Japan to 
claim ascendancy and superiority in Asia. Th e fi nal section off ers some refl ections on some of the con-
spicuous remarks of Pan-Asianism for the future of Japanese identity.
2. Identity Crisis Defi ned
　　Before going on to these matters, some definition of identity crisis and ideology is essential. The 
study of identity crisis owes its initial impetus to disorder, crisis, anomie, and hysteria set in motion in 
the late nineteenth and early twenty centuries. In these periods, Emile Durkheim’s Th e Division of Labor 
in Society [1893], Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer’s Studies on Hysteria [1895], and George Mead Mind, 
Self and Society [1934] provided important conceptual antecedents of identity crisis. Th e study of identity 
crisis as a serious social science enterprise, in particular, was largely Erik Erikson’s contribution follow-
ing World War II. Since its initial formulation in Erikson’s writings such as Young Man Luther: A Study 
in Psychoanalysis and History [1958] and Identity, Youth, and Crisis [1968], the concept of identity crisis 
has come into use by many scholars from various disciplines. In other words, Erikson as the psychothera-
pist cum social-science observer gave “identity crisis” a central place in identity theory of a number of 
disciplines and brought the term into common usage.
　　Social psychologists, for instance, have generally tended to study identity crisis in terms of inner 
processes. The dynamic source of identity crisis is attributed to a human bio-psychological disorder 
occurring when ambiguities and uncertainties appear and human life cannot be rendered more mean-
ingful and manageable. Sociologists conceptualize identity crisis as psychological conditions lacking not 
only shared beliefs and sentiments that unite peoples and comfort them by alleviating uncertainties but 
social norms that maintain the social order. It is likely to be a dearth of “collective conscience” which 
means the glue of dissimilar individuals of the same community which “connects successive generations 
with one another.” Political scientists have studied identity crisis as an important political phenomenon 
taking place in state formation, nation building process and modernization. Common to these disciplines 
is the notion that identity crisis is a psychological phenomenon of absence of a “deeper cultural code of 
meanings that relate the individual to the most general level of national and social meanings” [Weigert, 
Andrew, Smith Teitge, and Dennis Teitge 1986: 27-28].
　　It is obvious that Erik Erikson’s works provided varied disciplines with some insight to make clear 
the term of identity crisis. In association with the diff erent psychological confi gurations of identity for-
mation through the life cycle, Erikson paid a particular attention to the period of adolescence when the 
young individual has most dramatically and explicitly to integrate her/his own inner drives with the 
expectations of society. It is this period of adolescence which provided for Erikson what was a caricature 
of the inner and outer forces at work. In a diagrammatic representation of the stages in the life cycle, he 
characterized the major feature of adolescence as being identity crisis. He maintained that ambiguities 
and uncertainties of circumstance surrounding the young person and a failure to link her/himself to a 
cultural code of social meanings within a society lead to identity crisis or psychosocial moratorium. 
According to him, therefore, this is such a generally recognized phenomenon that adolescents are given 
identity crisis while the youth is allowed to fi nd her/himself. Th e identity crisis might be countered by an 
adaptive reaction in which a new synthesis of identifi cations or a new identity formation is made appro-
priate to the situation and its constraints. Without this adaptation, there would be ongoing crisis and the 
non-resolution of this dynamic is a distressed pathological state.
　　With a particular focus on the problems of new identity construction in adolescence, the other 
thrust of Erikson’s written work was to demonstrate that an identity formation is an ongoing negotiating 
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process from infancy through adolescence and middle age to old age so as to enhance physical and psy-
chological survival, security, and well-being. In this process the self attempts, especially in those prob-
lematic moments of ambiguity and crisis, to secure an identity that others do not bestow while others 
attempt to bestow an identity that the self does not appropriate. Th e construction of identity therefore is 
an ongoing, progressive and adaptive process inherent within each human. 
　　According to this adaptation of Erikson, a change of historical circumstances̶e.g. in the Japanese 
case, the confrontation with the West, the rapid Westernization, and the escape from Asia et al.̶would 
trigger the nation’s identity crisis by removing and altering the traditional value or ideology which pro-
vided the nation with legitimacy and authority. In other words, as Pye [1974: 110-111] and Bloom [1990: 37] 
put it, in the process of historical transformation of a nation an identity crisis occurs when a nation fi nds 
that what it had once unquestionably accepted as the physical and psychological defi nitions of its collec-
tive self are no longer acceptable under new historic conditions. In order for a nation to achieve a new 
level of performance, it is necessary for the participants in a nation to redefi ne who they are and how they 
are diff erent from all other political communities. Th erefore, there is a psychological dynamic of a nation 
not only to protect and enhance identifi cations already made, but also to make adaptive identifi cations 
and construct new identity. Th e inability of a nation to synthesize the changing historical confi gurations 
and to form the new identity, however, continues to lead to identity crisis̶from fear to acutely disabling 
paranoid, psychopathic and depressive disorder.
3. Ideology Described
　　In contrast to a political connotation referring to totalitarian systems of thought which distort his-
torical truth or Marx and Engels’ [1970: 47, 65-66] defi nition indicating an inversion of reality and a prod-
uct of false consciousness, Erikson [1958: 20] defi nes ideology as “an unconscious tendency underlying 
religious and scientifi c as well as political thought: the tendency at a given time to make facts amenable to 
ideas, and ideas to facts, in order to create a world image convincing enough to support the collective and 
the individual sense of identity. Far from being arbitrary or consciously manageable (although it is as 
exploitable as all of man’s unconscious strivings), the total perspective created by ideological simplifi ca-
tion reveals its strength by the dominance it exerts on the seeming logic of historical events, and by its 
infl uence on the identity formation of individuals (and thus on their ‘ego-strength’).” It makes available 
the essential circumstance for the next upper mode of identifi cation with it, infl uencing on the new iden-
tity formation of the nation. An ideology might bridge a political and psychological vacuum which his-
tory has created; to some new synthesis of past and future̶a synthesis which must include but transcend 
the past.
　　Erikson [1958: 38-39] viewed “ideology” as a signifi cant concept in identity formation, in association 
with the phrase “identity crisis.” Th e ideology is bound up with the question of identity crisis and the 
construction of new identity. Erikson’s concern with the conditions leading to the formation of new iden-
tity by overcoming identity crisis guides him to the study of ideology. Since he observes ideology in the 
context of identity crisis and identity formation, Erikson contributes a great deal to the understanding of 
how ideology plays a role in resolving identity crisis and creating new identity. His formulation helps us 
understand how ideology helps to deal with the identity crisis and satisfi es the identity formation. Power-
ful ideology and creative ideologists do much to deal with identity crisis. Th at is why the role of ideology 
is central to formation of new identity. Based on Erikson’s formation, I am inclined to the view that ideol-
ogy helps to perform two main functions: one directly social, binding the community together, and the 
other individual, organizing the role personalities of the maturing individual.
　　In order to overcome identity crisis and establish its new identity, every nation seems to seek to cre-
ate ideology [Sheehan 1993] because ideology offers to the members of nation determined answers to 
those vague inner stages and those urgent questions which arise in consequence of identity crisis. Ideol-
ogy renders social life signifi cant for those who suff er from identity crisis. Ideology provides “maps of 
problematic social reality” without which the societal arrangement would seem meaningless and the 
individual’s place in it unclear [Geertz 1973: 216-220]. Any impression that such maps correspond in some 
geodetic way to the social topography of a given period, however, is misleading. Ideology not only refl ects 
and interprets the social realities that sustain them; it also, in Berger and Luckmann’s [1966: 123-128] 
term, constructs those realities and remains in constant dialectical relationship with them. Ideology links 
particular actions and mundane practices with a wider set of meanings and, by helping to form new iden-
tity, lends a more honorable and dignified complexion to social conduct. Ideology is also viewed as a 
cloak for sharply motives and appearances. “Ideology” is a generic term applied to general ideas potent in 
specific situations of conduct. Because it is the link between action and fundamental belief, ideology 
helps to make more explicit the formation of new identity [Apter 1964: 16-17]. 
　　Ideology functions to solve identity crisis by building its bonds of aff ect, social commitment, and 
historical perspective [Sorel 1950]. Ideology, like language and dreams, is related to morphologies of 
behavior by universal psychobiological variables. Th e resolution of identity crisis and the formation of 
new identity are the desired results of ideological behavior. Ideology helps men to resolve identity crisis 
and form new identity by controlling and changing their environment. Such ideology arises out of action 
rather than out of pure speculation [Apter 1964: 20-21].
　　Since diff erent people construe their world diff erently, there is always a multiplicity of ideological 
formations to solve identity crisis within a nation̶e.g. in Japan Shintoism, Emperorism, nationalism, 
Pan-Asianism etc.. The question then arises, which̶or whose̶set of values and meanings becomes 
dominant. Gramsci’s [1971: 12-13] conception of hegemony recognizes that when a social group is success-
ful in persuading others of the validity of its own world view, force does not greatly exceed consent. Th e 
consent, moreover, permeates the society through the disseminating institutions that to many it seems 
commonsensical and natural. Th ese disseminating institutions, both public and private,̶for example, 
news articles, journals, associations, and school̶help to construct a shared ideological universe. Ideo-
logical formation is not singular and static but plural and dynamic in that “there are not only continuities 
and persistent determinations but also tensions, confl icts, resolutions and irresolutions, innovations and 
actual changes” [Williams 1982: 29]. In the meantime, if the new ideology were not enough to deal with 
the identity crisis, then the nation identity’s breakdown would ensue. Whether or not such identity crisis 
continues to damage a nation depends upon the extent to which the ideology is able to deal with the iden-
tity crisis. Nonetheless, ideology is essentially a psychological function, but its clothing will vary from 
historical circumstances to historical circumstances: nor is this to gainsay that ideology can be deliber-
ately created, manipulated, or appropriated [Bloom 1990: 38-39].
4. Th e Japanese Illustration: Identity Crisis and Pan-Asianism in the Meiji Period
　　Th roughout the history, ocean winds and currents, geography and distance, and, more importantly, 
its own self-perception, all seemed to work together to leave Japan insular, secluded and inward-looking 
and to develop and preserve a unique culture. Because of these factors, a good deal of scholars [Hunting-
ton 1993; Watanabe 1994; Arano 1988; Toby 1984; Tsurumi 1986; Inoguchi 1993, 2005; Umehara 1991; Ito 
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1999] argue that Japan has had a tendency to establish a distinctive identity on the Japanese archipelago 
by distancing itself from the Asian international order. Suffi  ce it to say, however, that we should not over-
emphasize the Japanese unique, secluded, and distinctive identity. Whether Japan has been engaging with 
or disengaging from the traditional Asian international order, geographic realities, historical connec-
tions, and cultural impact had put the range of geographic Asia at the center of Japan’s pre-modern iden-
tity. In other words, although Japan had developed its own distinctive identity helped by a natural geo-
graphical distance, thorough modification of the Chinese concepts̶so-called Japanization̶and her 
own self-awareness, Japan’s pre-modern identity was not entirely free from Asia, because of historical 
ties, and because Japan had benefi ted culturally and intellectually from its interactions with the continent 
[Scalapino 1964: 93-97]. Asia was one of sources for Japan’s pre-modern identity, its writing system, its 
cultural values in literature, philosophy, and thought, its Bushido, and its institutional examples in gov-
ernment and law. Th erefore, no emphasis on distinctiveness may be permitted to obscure the fact that 
Japan was Asian in outlook and values. While distinctiveness could exist, as Maruyama Masao [Quoted 
in Jansen 1965: 48] argues, the basic classifi cation through which the Japanese of that day saw their world 
and the primary way which the Japanese defi ned themselves were Confucian.
　　No cataclysmic crisis until the early nineteenth century had yet appeared to challenge the base of the 
pre-modern identity in Japan. It was Commodore Matthew Perry’s coercive naval diplomacy of 1853, 
however, that led Japan to depart decisively from the source of the pre-modern identity, to relinquish 
unfalteringly its remaining attachment to Asia, to think profoundly who Japanese were, and, more 
importantly, to cause enormously its identity crisis [Jansen 1965: 54-55; Oka 1961: 14-16]. Indeed, the new-
comers in Meiji period were not as docile as the Dutch with whom Japan continued to get in touch in 
Nagasaki in Tokugawa days. Th e nineteenth-century international order that Japan encountered was one 
characterized by European colonialism and the racial and cultural superiority of Europeans. It was clear 
that international order, now dominated by the West, was something of a jungle in which countries were 
friendly in the sun but hostile in the shade. Th us this period cliché about Western powers was “ravenous 
wolves.” Western-style Westphalian international order was non-traditional in that they came by sea, 
they discredited the traditional Asian international order, and they forced to emerge new thoughts and 
ideas, and to lead to Japanese identity crisis [Jansen 1980: 43-44, 53-60; Steffensen 2000: 141-142]. This 
external threat to the traditional Asian international order and to the pre-modern Japanese thoughts and 
way of life was the most powerful infl uence on Japanese identity crisis. Because Asia had played such a 
central role in Japanese pre-modern identity, the fact that the traditional Asian international order was 
clearly in process of dissolution was an important factor in the collapse of the pre-modern Japanese iden-
tity.
4.1. Th e Obsession with Westernization
　　Modernization meant Westernization. Accordingly, what was new was foreign̶the most important 
single fact in connection with the problem of Japanese identity. Direct resistance to the West was imme-
diately regarded to be futile and dangerous, because it could only result in devastation. Th e ultimate goal 
of Japanese leaders̶a party within Japan’s warrior aristocracy̶was the protection of Japan’s autonomy. 
Because the remaining choice was to modernize and to westernize Japan by emulating Western tech-
niques, institutions, and thoughts, Japanese leaders were extraordinarily receptive to Westernization, 
occasionally to imbecile extremes, even though later they indeed restored Japanese emperor and revital-
ized Shintoism. In 1868, the Meiji Japanese leaders therefore embarked upon a revolutionary program 
which established a new political and social order inspired by the civilization of their Western challeng-
ers and, paradoxically, led deeply to Japanese identity crisis by impairing pre-modern Japanese identity. 
Indeed, no one seriously questioned that most of the secrets necessary for national survival and strength 
were to be found in the West. Th ey accepted without serious reservation the idea that emulation would 
produce better results in Japan and, furthermore, modern progress required the near total Westerniza-
tion of Japanese society. Because the West was the only model of modernization, the Meiji leaders natu-
rally assumed that the Westernization process in Japan must proceed along these same lines of develop-
ment [Hotta 2007: 53-54; Jansen 1984: 62-64].
　　Indeed, Japan was a keen student of the West. Th e Iwakura mission of 1871-73 showed how Japan’s 
attitude was that of a willing pupil. Th e Iwakura mission provided the Meiji leaders with a twenty-one-
month world tour during which they had the opportunity to see for themselves. Th e mission, most of all, 
sought to demonstrate Japan’s acceptance of its place in the new international order, traveling to the 
United States and the several European powers. Th e previous conception of the Asian international order 
and the preceding Japan’s pre-modern identity became subject to fundamental rethinking, consequently. 
Japan was engaged in a serious endeavor to adjust its identity and adopt its behavior appropriate to the 
Eurocentric international order in order to be accepted as one of its full members [Suganami 1989: 191-2; 
Jansen 1980: 53-60].
　　Th e Westernization movement of the 1870s-80s in Japan represented the high-water mark of admira-
tion for the institutions and manners of the West. Th e admiration of the Western civilization and the ini-
tial desire for Westernizing reforms to strengthen the Japanese state were superseded by an obsession 
with the Westernization [Hirakawa 1998: 47-71]. Mutsu Munemitsu, returning from Europe in 1886, for 
instance, said it would be necessary to change everything, from the concrete things of daily life such as 
clothing, food, and houses to intangibles like education and morals [Jansen, 1980: 68-71]. Foreign Minis-
ter Inoue Kaoru also put it in 1887: “Let us change our empire into a European-style people. Let us create 
a new European-style empire on the Eastern sea” [Quoted in Watanabe 1938: 56]. Furthermore, in this 
period some intellectuals and political leaders hoped for a spiritual revolution that would go beyond 
institutional change to reform basic habits of thought and reshape patterns of behavior. Kozaki 
Hiromichi, for example, wrote in 1887 that “we must rid ourselves of Oriental traits,” adding “I hope we 
shall learn all of the ways of the West. We must not, in this progressive reform movement, simply adopt 
the externals of Western customs; we must go further and reform people’s minds as well” [Kokumin no 
tomo June 14, 1887: 33].
　　Th e most widely recognized advocates for the Westernization in this period were Tokutomi Sohō. 
Tokutomi, who ironically later became a staunch anti-Westernist, captured the imagination of many Jap-
anese youth by expressing their enthusiasm for building a progressive Western society in Japan. Toku-
tomi was convinced that the adoption of Western ethics and values was imperative for Japan’s progress as 
a civilization [Pyle 1969: 24-25]. Tokutomi triumphantly proclaimed his own: “Japanese education must 
be wholly Western.” Th e material and spiritual aspects of Western society, he emphasized, were indivisi-
ble. Tokutomi called on youth to reject the traditional traits of the Japanese people, traits that were the 
legacy of Japan’s long feudal experiences: they should shun unprogressive and acquiescence characteris-
tics, avoid social indifference, and overcome irrationality. Youth should, rather, emulate the qualities 
found in the liberal, democratic societies of the West: they should develop progressive and innovative 
natures and become self-reliant, responsible, logical, and scientifi c [Tokutomi 1930: 7-9]. Th e ideas Toku-
tomi expressed in Youth of the New Japan published in 1885 evinced a profound alienation from his 
country’s traditions and cultural heritage. Japan’s past seemed to him devoid of the ingredients necessary 
in modern society. Whereas most Japanese regarded as inevitable that Japanese institutions, techniques, 
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and values would have to be modifi ed, he believed they had to be wholly displaced. He was impatient with 
compromises and halfway measures in the process of Westernization [Pyle 1969: 35-36].
4.2. Leave Asia and Join the West 
　　Th e conspicuous manifestation of the fervor to Westernization was extreme revulsion toward tradi-
tional Asian international relations, values, and ideas along with the dominant belief in the superiority of 
Western civilization. It seemed that Westernization required discarding traditional international rela-
tionship with Asian neighbors in favor of their Western counterparts. A good example of this attitude is 
comprehensively demonstrated in the impression Itagaki Taisuke recorded in 1883 aft er a trip to Europe. 
He expressed resignation that Westerners would always regard Japan as “Asian”: “Consider, for example, a 
primitive [yaban] country. Some of its people are intelligent, but because the majority are not, the country 
is inevitably called primitive. In the same way, no matter how far Japan progresses, no matter how 
enlightened she becomes, just because the great majority of people in other Asian countries are ignorant 
and primitive, the whole of Asia is considered primitive” [Quoted in Matsumoto 1961: 95].
　　Th erefore, the Meiji Japanese leaders tried to dissociate Japan’s identity from the continent so that 
the newly civilizing and rapidly modernizing Japan could not be lumped together with the despotic and 
decadent neighbors within the club of civilized nations called the West. Meiji educator Fukuzawa Yukichi 
[1973: 133] who published a widely noted piece called “Casting off Asia” (Datsu-a ron) in March 1885 
explained:
  To plan our course now, therefore, our country cannot afford to wait for the enlightenment of our 
neighbors and to cooperate in building Asia up. Rather we should leave their ranks to join the camp of 
the civilized countries of the West. Even when dealing with China and Korea, we need not have special 
scruples simply because they are our neighbors, but should behave towards them as the Westerners do. 
One who befriends an evil person cannot avoid being involved in his notoriety. In spirit, then, we break 
with our evil friends of Eastern Asia.
Th is argument sought to separate the identity of Japan, which was progressing rapidly toward civiliza-
tion, from that of the rest of Asia, which seemed to lag far behind. Aft er having been looked down upon 
by the Western powers at the beginning of its career as a major player on the international scene, Japan in 
turn tended to treat its Asian neighbors with a sort of disdain because in the nineteenth century Asia was 
considered to be synonymous with backwardness [Klien 2002: 23; Steffensen 2000: 142-143; Inoguchi 
2005: 13; Hatsuse 1984: 32-38; Oka 1961: 35-46]. Furthermore, wood-block prints from the 1890s had 
described Japanese soldiers as more Caucasian than their Chinese foes [Hatch 2010: 388] and Taguchi 
Ukichi in 1904 right before Russo-Japanese War claimed that Japanese was not Yellow race [Oguma 1995: 
174-176]. Th ese refl ected not only an acceptance of the notion of Western superiority, an internalization of 
Orientalism and  an identifi cation of itself within the Eurocentric international order, but also a rejection 
of Asia identifi ed with a past that Japan wished to leave behind on the other.
4.3. Identity and Schizophrenia 
　　Th e revolutionary transformation of Japan from a weak, feudal, and agrarian country into a modern 
industrial power̶economically and militarily capable of resisting foreign domination̶seemed to be 
very successful. Equally as impressive was the speed with which most Japanese surrendered their pre-
modern identity and commitments to traditional relationship with Asian neighbors [Cohen 2000: 
286-287]. A major survey of modern world history concludes that the change undergone by Japan in the 
Meiji period “still stands as the most remarkable transformation ever undergone by any people in so short 
a time” [Palmer and Colton 1961: 554]. Japan won a reputation among the Western Powers as a civilized 
nation, deeply impressing Westerners, and consequently being accepted as a ‘special status, which set 
Japan distinctly apart from the rest of the non-white world’ [Winter 1974: 185; Steff ensen 2000: 143; Muto 
2001: 174]. European newsarticles and journals, for example, began to depict Japan which was “dynamic, 
developed rapidly, had adopted European political institutions, and behaved like a proud European coun-
try” [Korhonen 1997: 351] as the singular successful case of Westernization and reform on the larger Asian 
continent, which overall was failing to reform itself. Even some European authors felt they had to exam-
ine Japan to rethink whether its achievements could teach European states anything [Dyer 1904].
　　In spite of the fact that such passions to adopt Western civilization, to identify itself with the West, 
and to distance the Asia led to remarkable achievements within a short period, paradoxically this period 
was full of contradictions, confusion, and identity crisis. Although this revolution upon which the Meiji 
leadership embarked in 1868 saved Japan from national disaster such as was experienced nearly every-
where else in Asia, it exacted a fearful cost in historical and cultural dislocation, and thus in psychologi-
cal strain, identity crisis. It caused the generation who was growing up amidst this revolutionary social 
and cultural transformation to endure extraordinary mental agonies. As Hatayama [1891: 26-27] pointed 
out, Meiji Japan was indeed as sick nation because of its mania for Westernization and escape from Asia. 
For many Japanese in this period of intense national consciousness, alienation from their own pre-mod-
ern identity posed perplexing dilemmas. In other words, (1) the Westernization and (2) the identifi cation 
as part of the West aff ected Japanese to the core of their being: they lost their self-esteem and suff ered 
from all the psychological throes.
　　Firstly, the underlying cause of Japanese identity crisis was the threat of absorption or destruction by 
the West. Because of threat, an essentially elite abandoned traditional values and turned with great seri-
ousness to the task of Westernizing the nation. Japanese, however, were troubled by the implications of 
the Westernization, for the very Westernization they sought had in some sense to be regarded as alien in 
origin. Th ey were in fact painfully sensitive to the self-eff acement that cultural borrowing implied. Th ey 
saw in Westernization the destruction of pre-modern Japanese identity [Pyle 1969: 3-4]. For instance, 
Kozaki Hiromichi [1933: 36-37], who became a leading Christian educator, tells in his autobiography of 
the mental agony he suff ered as a young man: “Th e year and a half spent as a Christian inquirer is the 
unhappiest period of my life. Th e rational part of me rebelled against taking the decisive step; yet to turn 
away from Christianity and be content with Confucianism would leave my spirit of inquiry unsatisfi ed. 
Th is dilemma so wrought on me that I had a nervous breakdown.” Th e attempt to live according to new 
values that were “not insensibly acquired in childhood as part of the natural order of things, but learned, 
usually late, as part of a self-conscious quest for appropriate forms of behavior” was oft en distressing.
　　Erwin Baelz [1932: 17], a German doctor who arrived in Japan in 1876 to teach at Tokyo University 
and watched the Japanese undergo their psychological disturances, refers to in his diary the embarrass-
ment and stress he discovered among his students over their cultural heritage:
  But (and here I come to the strangest feature of the situation) the Japanese have their eyes fi xed exclu-
sively on the future, and are impatient when a word is said of their past. Th e cultured among them are 
actually ashamed of it. “Th at was in the days of barbarian,” said one of them in my hearing. Another, 
when I asked about Japanese history, bluntly rejoined: “We have no history. Our history begins today.” 
Others have smiled in an embarrassed way when I have asked them such questions, and did not thaw 
until they at length came to realize that I had a genuine interest in the matter.
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　　As Tokutomi Sohō [1935: 109-111] and the brooding Kitamura Tokoku [Mathy 1963: 1-28] point out, 
the melancholia, mental turmoil and mental sickness (nobyo) were widespread among students in the 
1870s and 1880s. Since the old Japan collapsed, but the new Japan rose not yet, Japanese had no sure sense 
of their identity. Japanese were likely to wander in confusion through a deep fog, unable to fi nd their way. 
Th us, there was already discernible in them a clear sense of identity crisis, which illustrated the psycho-
logical strains many Japanese were beginning to feel, caught as they were in the rapid transition from old 
to new and the pull between native tradition and modern values associated with the West [Reischauer 
1964: 157-158].
　　It was the historical predicament to be caught in a confrontation of circumstances that intensifi ed 
the awareness of their heritage and at the same time stigmatized it. Traditional skills became outdated; 
old ways of organizing and viewing social life became problematic and controversial. Th is process, entail-
ing as it did a sudden loss of trust in the immediate world and in its transmitters and interpreters, left  
Japanese with identity crisis. In other words, serious problems of identity were created by this confl ict of 
historical experience and transformative period.
　　Secondly, Japan took paradoxical attitude that even though it was geographically located in Asia, it 
denied belonging to it. As Oguma [2007: 211] notes, “Asia” for Japan was less a geographical term or any 
strictly defined term at all. Japanese therefore attempted to identify themselves as part of the modern 
Western world that functioned in a Western framework. Japanese kept their Asian look, but Japanese 
wished to see themselves as part of the modern Western world conceptualized in Western terms. Th is 
identifi cation as part of the West forced Japan to be imprisoned between the East and the West, and dis-
turbed intensely and continuously its identity [Wagatsuma 1967: 407-443]. In other words, Japan’s posi-
tion as an Asian country that joined the ranks of the industrialized Western world at a relatively early 
stage preconditioned it for being faced with the very fundamental identity question to which continent it 
truly belonged. 
　　As a matter of fact, by taking the way to leave Asia, Japan came to be obsessed with being part of the 
West. Needless to say, the obsession to join the West and distance from Asia led to, and deepened, the 
Japanese identity crisis from fear, frustration and suspicion to paranoid disarray and schizophrenia 
because Japan was not accepted as a genuine member of the Western community owing to its race [Tama-
moto 2003: 204]. What intensified identity crisis was that, despite Japan’s civilized status and proven 
record of Westernization, Japanese people continued to face discrimination on the basis of their identifi -
cation with the yellow race and Asian culture and Japan was hypocritically excluded from the Western 
community in the context of the permanent racial and civilizational superiority of the West over “yellow 
race” Asians. 
　　As even Tokutomi Sohō, once Western-inspired reformist fi gure, for example, wrote, “despite having 
become the most progressive, civilized, and powerful nation in the Orient and joining the West by dis-
tancing from Asia, Japan had to endure the scorn of the white people” [Quoted in Pierson 1980: 229, 235] 
and to adapt to view itself as victimized by the West. Indeed, the West did not abandon the basic black/
white dichotomy of Orientalism and its hierarchical positioning of the West and East. No matter the suc-
cess rate of Japanese reforms, therefore, Japan as non-Christian and non-white nation would never per-
fectly fulfi ll all the required standards of civilization because of defects in its racial identity and makeup, 
or cultural character. It was obvious that Western humanistic values were not meant for universal appli-
cation. Self-determination, justice, equality and individualism all proved to be nothing but a false con-
sciousness for the pursuit of national interests by the Western powers [Kano 1976: 9-10]. For example, an 
editorial in Kokumin no tomo in late 1893 entailed “Japan’s Talent for Assimilation” complained that 
Westerners’ praise of Japan for her swift  adoption of Western civilization was unfl attering and conde-
scending: “Th ey regard us as only a step above Fiji or Hawaii. Th ey praised Japan only because they were 
accustomed to comparing her to Siam and Annam” [Kokumin no tomo Oct. 23, 1893]. Despite Japan’s 
great progress in adopting civilized institutions and in developing its national strength, Japan could not 
escape the scorn of white people. It turned out, furthermore, that Japan was traumatized and frustrated 
by the 1895 Triple Intervention when France, Russia and Germany robbed Japan of the fruits of her vic-
tory over China. Th e Japanese public was outraged, but the Japanese leaders were not ready to challenge 
the Europeans. Th e Japanese would not forget. Th e Triple Intervention therefore completed Japanese dis-
illusionment. Th is event had a momentous impact on the psychology of Japanese, who had once made a 
signifi cant turn away from Asia and searched for their identity in the West by pursuing joining the West 
[Aydin 2007: 151; Miwa 1973: 188-189]. Th e psychological result of this intolerable discrimination was a 
sense of humiliation, suspicion, fear, frustration and insecurity, which led to the notion that Japan was in 
identity crisis. As a consequence, suspicion and fear of the West and Japan’s frustration and insecurity 
came to an integral part of modern Japanese identity crisis.
5. Pan-Asianism: Antidote of Identity Crisis
　　Since its beginning with Japan’s opening to the world, one of the primary goals of Japanese had been 
to establish its identity in an alien world. Because the pre-modern Japanese identity within unstable geo-
political space and under the external threat was forced to be redefi ned, however, it turned out that Japan’
s eff orts to westernize itself and to redefi ne its identity within the Eurocentric international order proved 
a profoundly transformative psychological shock [Steff ensen 2000: 141]. Th e struggles since the 1860s and 
the turmoil of Japan’s own identity seem to have necessitated a more profound exploration of itself and its 
environment. Since ideology provides a nation with steadfast remedy to the psychological shock, the 
grave inner matters, and the ambiguity which take place in consequence of identity crisis, Japan sought 
naturally to construct ideology. Working out an ideology was for Japan a way of resolving the identity 
crisis. From the time Japan experienced its identity crisis, Japanese sought fi rst to conceive and then to 
inculcate an ideology suitable for modern Japan. As a consequence, a number of competing or consoli-
dating ideologies that had the effects of identity crisis appeared. Japanese elites opted for Shintoism, 
Emperorism, Japanese nationalism, and Pan-Asianism etc. as the dominant ideologies in a new modern 
nation. Those ideologies were socially created and absorbed, providing temporarily, to a large extent, 
antidote of troublesome reality in Japan.
　　Unlike other ideologies, Pan-Asianism (Dai-Ajiashugi) had a vision that a regional identity could 
somehow mediate between emergent nationalisms and provide a convincing counterargument to the 
challenge of western dominance. Pan-Asianism was a basis for eff orts to resolve the identity crisis and 
construct its regional identity. It was also the antithesis of the government’s foreign policy, which aimed 
at joining the West, while criticizing the Western imperial discourse and rejecting the Eurocentric claims 
to the universality of modern civilization and inclusiveness of the international relations. Th e main cri-
tique of Pan-Asianism was directed against the uncivilized and hypocritical acts and ideologies of Euro-
pean imperialism, which provoked the quest for regional identity [Takeuchi 1963: 23]. Even though it has 
faded from the contemporary historical imagination, in the last quarter of the nineteenth and the early 
twenty centuries it had a powerful hold on elites around Asia, especially in Japan and India, and to some 
extent in China and Korea. Fuelled by a powerful idea of community between Asian nations defining 
themselves against the colonialist West and constructing regional identity, Pan-Asianism appeared to 
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have immense cultural power a century ago. Yet just a few decades later, it was distorted by the Japanese 
militarist government into a brutal ideology of imperialism which served as a cloak for expansionism and 
as a tool for legitimizing Japanese hegemony and colonial rule.
5.1. Th e Concept of Pan-Asianism 
　　Pan-Asianism arose out of the identity crisis of Meiji Japan, attempting to fi nd a regional identity 
through Asian cultural heritage. Th e Japanese intellectuals were burdened with moral obligations in pro-
viding a basis to resolve identity crisis. Th eir intellectual response to identity crisis was adherence to the 
indigenous value-institutional structure. This response fundamentally involved a complex attempt to 
reappropriate the Asia as a value-laden category and to redefi ne Japan in relation to it. In other words, 
their reaction was based on the belief that the Japanese share common physical traits with their continen-
tal neighbors, Koreans and Chinese, or that they belong to an Asian world system with historical roots. It 
was manifested in Pan-Asianism in the eff orts to rediscover the ideals of the East, to develop the ideas of 
“same race and same culture” (dobun doshu), to awaken the East, to place Japan again in Asia so as to 
resolve its identity crisis. Parallel to these eff orts, they developed notions of regional Asian identity as a 
counterpart to the Western claim for universality and in opposition to imperialist Eurocentric interna-
tional order [Narangoa 2007: 52; McCormack 2001: 161-2; Aydin 2007: 8-9; Tamamoto 2003: 198; Miwa 
2007: 21; Takeuchi 1963: 8-13, 22-23].
　　Th ey advocated a “return to Asia” (Ajia kaiki). For them Asia, or the East (toyo), as a cultural, geo-
graphical and historical concept, was the spatial and temporal object through which Japanese defi ned 
themselves and a potential antidote to the crisis of identity that had resulted from the Westernization and 
the integration of Japan into the Eurocentric world. Pan-Asianism resorted to an imagined Asian past of 
great spiritual and geographical dimensions to legitimize their claims of regional identity. As a conse-
quence, Pan-Asianism helped Japanese̶as well as Chinese, Korean, and others̶feel, for the fi rst time, 
Asian [Koschmann 1997: 85; Saaler 2007: 2-3; Tanaka 1993: 77].
　　Many of the early Pan-Asianists, sharing strong feeling of identity crisis in the process of Western-
ization and escape from Asia, began their political activities in the Freedom and People’s Rights move-
ment, combining its criticism of Japan’s foreign policy toward Asia with opposition to the elitist non-
democratic process of Westernization then under way at home. For example, Oi Kentaro, one of the 
leaders of the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement of the 1870s and 1880s, called on Japan to remain, 
and defi ne itself, in Asia and to support the reform and strengthening of Korea, pointing out that such an 
action would serve to promote the security and prosperity of the entire region. Oi Kentaro’s vision of 
Asian solidarity contrasted with Fukuzawa’s “Escape from Asia” argument [Aydin 2007: 34]. In 1893, prior 
to the Sino-Japanese War, Tarui Tōkichi [1964: 106-129; Hiraishi 1994: 271-275] in his “Federated states of 
great East (Daitō gappōron)” called for a federation of Japan and Korea. His idea, that the only hope for 
survival for the small Asian nations was in joining forces, refl ected among the Japanese a perception con-
cerning Japan’s role and its identity in Asia. Above all, the most important organizations or fi gures of the 
early Pan-Asianism were Seikyosha, Toho kyokai, Miyazaki brothers, and Okakura Tenshin. Members of 
these organizations and these individuals were important publicists who sought to decline the Western-
ization and escape from Asia along with awareness of identity crisis. Th ese Pan-Asianists found in Pan-
Asianism a means of extricating themselves not only from their personal identity crisis, but a potent ide-
ology to elucidate Japan and Asia’s role in the modern world. Th ey gave formulation of the essential basis 
of Asian unity and regional identity and attempted to redefi ne Japan’s identity in the context of the Asian 
tradition and value by emphasizing Asia as a whole rather than Japan alone.
5.1.1. Seikyosha 
　　Seikyosha was one of the cruxes of Pan-Asianism. Seikyosha (Society for Political Education) led by 
Miyake Setsurei (1860-1945), Shiga Shigetaka (1863-1927), and Kuga Katsunan (1857-1907) provided Japa-
nese intellectuals with philosophical grounds to formulate a new regional identity by the assessment of 
Westernization and escape from Asia. Th ey joined together in early 1888 to form the Seikyosha and pub-
lished a series of popular periodicals, Nihonjin (the Japanese), Ajia (Asia), and Nihon oyobi Nihonjin 
(Japan and the Japanese). In fact, Seikyosha intellectuals, who had attended new Western-oriented 
schools from a young age, revealed a deeper consciousness of the complexity of Western thought and pol-
itics, having a close familiarity with the writings of Herbert Spencer, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 
Francois Guizot, Henry Buckle, and Th omas Carlyle. Th us they were, to a degree, attracted to the liberat-
ing elements of Western thought. But despite their knowledges of Western ideas, they chose to resist the 
headlong rush to Westernization and join of the West that many of their peers were embracing under 
similar circumstances. Th ey objected to the prevailing tendency to prefer Western values over Asian ones. 
Th eir liberal backgrounds rather served as a wake-up call for Pan-Asianist consciousness because Seikyo-
sha intellectuals were disturbed by the prevailing adulation of Western culture among large numbers of 
Japanese and were also painfully conscious of the psychological shocks and ominous nature of the trend 
toward Westernization and escape from Asia [Pyle 1969: 53-64]. Th e craze in Japan for Westernization 
and escape from Asia which George B. Sansom [1950: 475-476] described as “an almost fanatical phase” of 
popular sentiment in the 1870s and 1880s, reinforced the doubts these Seikyosha intellectuals had for 
Westernization and escape from Asia. To accept subservience to the West would cause, they believed, 
identity crisis. Kuga, for instance, was aware that in addition to drastic aggressive action, Western impe-
rialism could come from a slower process of cultural and psychological encroachment. Hence he thought 
it the intellectual’s duty to warn his countrymen of this crisis. Because Westernization and escape from 
Asia were taken as serious forces directly causing Japan’s identity crisis, the Seikyosha members including 
Kuga felt compelled to deal with this identity crisis [Tam 1977: 191].
　　By drawing attention to the importance of an awareness of Asia as a cultural and ethnic unit, the 
Seikyosha members tried somehow to restore nourishing ties with the cultural Asian heritage from which 
they had been cut off . Th ey attempted to redefi ne Japan’s identity in the context of the Asian tradition in 
order to create a new identity. In other words, they sought to reevaluate Asian history and values, to fi nd 
something in the past that they and the world could esteem and that need not be sacrifi ced in the course 
of Westernization, something by virtue of which they could defi ne their uniqueness and thus feel them-
selves the equals of Westerners [Pyle 1969: 53-55]. For instance, Asia could off er, Seikyosha intellectuals 
argued, a development model diff erent from, yet as good as, that of Western nations. Seikyosha intellec-
tual Miyake Setsurei, in particular, in Shin-zen-bi Nihonjin (Th e Japanese: Truth, goodness, and beauty), 
a treatise written in 1891, accepted that the cultures of the Western nations were at the highest stage of 
civilization, but he argued that the Mongolian civilizations had developed along the Yellow River as equal 
in maturity and sophistication to Western civilization [Aydin 2007: 45-46]. Th erefore, Seikyosha intellec-
tuals believed that they had every reason to take pride in the early accomplishments of their Mongoloid 
peoples. Because Asia’s past was the source of their distinctive identity, they pointed out, Japanese should 
esteem it rather than repudiate it [Pyle 1969: 150-156]. Th e greatness and legacy of Asian civilization had 
to be preserved in order to counter the adulation of Western civilization and overcome the identity crisis. 
　　Meanwhile, they developed the concept of the kokusui (cultural essence of the nation) in order to 
defend indigenous Asian and Japanese tradition and value against the trend of Westernization and escape 
from Asia. They claimed that the promotion of the kokusui that they were aiming was of a universal 
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nature. Above all, the duty of the Seikyosha, they believed, was not in advocating the promotion of koku-
sui literally all over the world, but, more importantly, to advocate its promotion in Japan and in other 
Asian countries which were then not aware of their unique kokusui as well. To promote simultaneously 
the kokusui of Japan and Asia would awaken the Japanese to their glorious heritage, out of which the Jap-
anese could develop a force to resist Westernization and escape from Asia. Th e promotion of kokusui in 
Asia as well as Japan as Japan’s mission and duty became a common theme in Seikyosha [Tam 1977: 
191-192].
 
5.1.2. Th e Oriental Society 
　　In the late 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s, various organizations were formed to promote matters pertaining 
to Asia and to advocate Pan-Asianism. Th e Shina-kai (Promote Asia Society) and the Koa-Kai (Society 
for Raising Asia) were formed in Tokyo to promote knowledge about Asia in 1878 and 1880 respectively. 
Th e Ajia kyōkai (Asia Association), Koa-kai’s successor organization, was established in 1883 [Teow 1999: 
9]. In the meantime, determined to overcome what they believed was a debilitating preoccupation with 
Westernization and escape from Asia, Seikyosha members sought practical ways of developing a Japanese 
mission in world aff airs. In 1890, they took the lead in forming a group called the Oriental Society (Toho 
kyokai), which they hoped would be instrumental in diverting Japan’s primary attention from the West 
to her immediate surroundings in Asia. One indication of its success was the growing membership of the 
Oriental Society, whose membership lists reveal the names of many prominent politicians, scholars, and 
journalists. Around 300 people had joined by the summer of 1891; on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War 
the membership was almost 1,000. The fact that over the next decades these people, diverse in back-
ground, united in commitment, continued to interact in similar Asia groups lent consistency to Japan’s 
outlook on the rest of Asia [Harrell 1992: 21]. 
　　Th e Oriental Society was dedicated to overcoming the information gap on Asia, thereby redirecting 
Japanese attention toward Asia and proclaiming the existence of an East Asian identity based on culture 
and script which were in use in China, Korea, and Japan ̶“Although we have people who are familiar 
with things from the faraway West, there are none with a thorough knowledge of conditions in the vari-
ous Asian countries nearby” [Quoted in Harrell 1992: 21]. Th e Society published a monthly magazine, the 
Oriental Society Report (Toho kyokai hokoku), which contained material on the geography, economics, 
diplomacy, and history of Asian countries [Nihon May 9, 1891: 3]. In addition, the founders expressed 
their intention of sending study expeditions to various parts of Asia and establishing a library and a 
museum for the study of Asian culture. Ultimately the Society’s purpose, as the Report described it, was 
to help Japan fulfi ll her mission of guiding the less developed countries of Asia, protecting them from 
Western powers, and contributing to world civilization.
　　Th e founders of the Oriental Society believed that Japan’s identity must be defi ned in terms of her 
historical ties with Asia. The Japanese people must study their own things, said the first issue of the 
Report, and in order to do this they must also investigate the cultures of neighboring countries. Since the 
Restoration, the Japanese had so busied themselves in amassing knowledge of the West that they had 
neglected their own country and neighboring countries with whose destiny Japan’s was most closely 
linked. As a consequence, the founders believed that Japanese scholars had to be independent for knowl-
edge of Japan itself. For them, Japan’s identity was also a matter of her geographical position, which 
bound her to the Asian continent: Japan’s most important problem was deciding where her destiny lied. 
Europe and America were not areas where Japanese now could compete, owing to geographical position 
and inadequate strength. Asia was the place for Japanese progress [Pyle 1969: 156-160].
5.1.3. Miyazaki brothers: “Asia fi rsters” 
　　Th e Miyazaki brothers (Tamizō, Yazō, and especially Tōten [Torazō]) was born to a gōshi landlord 
family in Kyushu’s Kumamoto Prefecture. Tōten (1870-1922) was the youngest son. One brother, Hachirō, 
was killed in the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877; two older brothers and two sisters survived to maturity. Th ey 
came through the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement of the 1880s and 1890s, with its idealism of 
human betterment, democracy, and social reform, while having intimate knowledge of the hardships of 
tenant life under the Meiji provisions for a regular monetized tax. In particular, Yazō emphasized the 
importance of a solution that would embrace all Asia, and not just Japan alone. In other words, he associ-
ated the human problem of hunger with the Asian problem of reform and of independence, and held that 
the problem of China was central to a solution of the problem of Asia and Japan and, indeed, of all man-
kind. Youngest Tōten did so under the infl uence of his brother, Yazō. 
　　Tōten was an outstanding example of romantic Pan-Asianism who devoted some thirty years of his 
life to collaboration with Sun Yat-sen and Chinese nationalists, as a publicist, fi nancier, supplier of arms, 
and combatants. Tōten was educated at a mission school as well as a private school run by the journalist 
Tokutomi Sohō. His education in nineteenth-century European liberalism was a guiding light for his 
equally revolutionary activities in Korea and the Philippines. Like many other Minken believers who 
professed Pan-Asianism, he approached international politics in terms of the nineteenth-century Euro-
pean liberalism of Giuseppe Mazzini’s persuasion, upholding the view that democratic rights could and 
should be accorded to individual nations. For this to happen, however, the nations suff ering under impe-
rialism must first be liberated and must determine their own destinies. In such a process of national 
awakening, he saw Japan as being able to provide practical support, as he tried to show by his own exam-
ple [Jansen 1984: 74-75; Hotta, 2007: 43-44; Takeuchi 1963: 44-48]. 
　　Tōten put his eff orts and lives to redressing his government’s determined “Europe fi rst” policies of 
Westernization and escape from Asia. Being critical and distrustful of Japanese imperialism, Tōten’s con-
cern was with all mankind, and especially with Asia, and his goal was nothing less than the revival of 
Asia. He argued that Japan’s future lay in Asia, and that it was tied to its Asian neighbors by traditions of 
culture, language, and race and could expect no fi nal home in Westernization and escape from Asia that 
were increasingly causing traumatic identity crisis. Th us Japan and Asia’s restoration to sovereignty and 
dignity depended upon the revival of China, its largest and most important state. In other words, solu-
tions to the Japanese problem, the Asian problem, and in fact the world problem, all lay in China. China’s 
resurrection from weakness and humiliation, however, would require a political and social revolution to 
free it from the shackle of the Manchu dynasty. Th at revolution, in turn, depended upon the identifi ca-
tion of a hero who could call the country back to health and strength. Tōten along with his brother, Yazō, 
resolved to seek for a ‘hero’ who might be able to overthrow the old order and solve its social and political 
problems [Etō and Jansen 1982: xiii- xxviii].
　　As his My Th irty-Th ree Years Dream shows a romantic and oft en melancholy account of the fate of 
pure motives in the impure world of Japan and the failure of eff orts to mount a revolution in south China 
at the end of the nineteenth century, Tōten’s career revolved around his hero, Sun Yat-sen, and the Chi-
nese revolution. Indeed, he was the most important of a small group of Japanese Pan-Asianists who 
devoted their lives to helping their Chinese friends overthrow the Manchu dynasty. Th us Tōten was a 
Byronian, or perhaps more accurately, Lafayettesque romantic because he saw the ousting as an essential 
fi rst step in a world-wide crusade for freedom and justice in which his role was that of a chivalrous Lafay-
ette to Sun Yet-sen’s Washington. Resolved to infi ltrate Chinese society and work closely with his hero, he 
tried to approach China through Korea, through Siam, where he led a group of immigrant farmers, 
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through the Philippines, where Aguinaldo was resisting the new American overlords, and fi nally through 
service with Sun Yat-sen, whose cause he served throughout the rest of his life [Etō and Jansen 1982: xiii- 
xxviii]. 
　　For other Japanese, an affi  liation with the West should never be more than tactical. Japan’s mission 
was to be an Asian power, and its autonomy and strength, once established in Western eyes, should be 
devoted to working out a role of leadership in Asian change against the West. Th is kind of Asian con-
sciousness could easily converge with Japanese nationalism to encourage expansion, and many “Asia 
fi rsters” who began with a position of anti-government liberalism ended by urging their government to 
take a fi rmer line on the nearby continent. Tōten, however, did not. Although his career, like his interests, 
saw frequent overlap and occasional cooperation with advocates of national strength and national expan-
sion, he reminded independent and distrustful of them. He was not won to the cause of Asia by popular 
sentiment in the Meiji period. He saw himself, romantically as always, as a chivalrous hero working for 
the colored races of mankind, and not as the servant of his country nor his emperor. A temporary gov-
ernment assignment made it possible for him to fi nd Sun Yat-sen in 1897, but it was the government that 
facilitated his needs, and not he that served the Meiji government. Th us his life is a story of crusade for 
China and for Asia [Matsuzawa 1979: 100-104]. His story provides invaluable insights in modern Asian 
history concerning the psychological, social, and intellectual crisis of Meiji period and the Japanese intel-
lectuals’ response to it. 
5.1.4. Okakura Tenshin 
　　Okakura Tenshin (Kakuzō; 1862–1913), a gift ed art historian who studied with Ernest Fenollosa at 
Tokyo University, is usually referred to as the pioneer of Japanese Pan-Asianism and Japan’s intellectual 
revolt against Westernization and escape from Asia [Benfey 2003: 75-108]. He formulated the most 
sophisticated and internationalist version of Pan-Asianism, calling for the resurgence of Asia in order to 
protect it from the plethora of Westernization and escape from Asia. He underlined the creative vitality 
of Chinese and Indian civilizations that had adapted to changing historical circumstances over millennia 
and attained high levels of maturity [Najita and Harootunian 1998: 211-212; Matsuzawa 1979: 13-44].
　　Okakura was born in Yokohama in 1862, three years aft er the commercial treaties had opened Japan 
to trade with the West. In the young age, his life was clearly divided into two halves: the fi rst involved his 
studies of the English language and Western culture in Yokohama under the tutelage of men such as John 
Ballagh; the second introduced him to the writings of Confucius and Mencius, Chinese Poetry, and the 
fi ne art of calligraphy under the supervision of the priests of the Chōenji. Th is dual life led him to feel the 
sense of identity crisis̶that is to say, to be aware that Japanese pre-modern identity had been seriously 
threatened by Westernization and escape from Asia. Like many of Pan-Asianists, therefore, Okakura 
pursued the universalism of Buddhism and Asian art as well as his Asian and Japanese skills and knowl-
edge so as to overcome his identity crisis [Notehelfer 1990: 312-322].
　　Okakura [1984: 136] saw the international aff airs of the late nineteenth century as a confl ict between 
East and West, rejecting a Eurocentric notion of Enlightenment and universal civilization and taking the 
opinion that “the glory of Europe is the humiliation of Asia.” He attributed European aggression to the 
“restless maritime instincts of the Mediterranean and Baltic, born of chase and war, of piracy and pillage” 
and contrasted it with the “continental contentment of agricultural Asia.” For Okakura, it was not the 
decadent materialism of the West but rather the virility and energy of its own civilizational legacy that 
should become the basis of Asia’s political revival, unity, and identity. Okakura, therefore, urged Asians 
to prepare themselves for an intellectual confrontation with the West by reviving their native civiliza-
tions, unity, and identity. In the meantime, Okakura was confi dent in his call for a return to and revival 
of Asia and a construction of regional identity, as his ideas were strongly inspired by the rising critiques 
against Western rationalism and materialism in Europe. Th e following passage from Okakura Tenshin’s 
Ideals of the East reveals how closely the notion of a return to and a revival of Asian civilization, unity, 
and identity was tied to a perception of a larger crisis in European civilization: “Not only to return to our 
own past ideals, but also to feel and revivify the dormant life of the old Asiatic unity, becomes our mis-
sion. Th e sad problems of Western society turn us to seek a higher solution in Indian religion and Chi-
nese ethics. Th e very trend of Europe itself, in German philosophy and Russian spirituality, in its latest 
developments, towards the East, assists us in the recovery of these nations themselves nearer to the stars 
in the night of their material oblivion” [Okakura 1903: 223].
　　Okakura’s anti-colonial sensibilities and embrace of Asia as an alternative to the West rendered a 
meta-geographical image that sometimes included even the non-Buddhist parts of Asia. His Pan-Asian-
ism had the most all-encompassing vision for both geographical and conceptual boundaries of Asia as a 
single group, being not based on the identity of the yellow race and Chinese culture but instead on a 
broad notion of Asian civilization, unity, and identity [Hotta 2007: 30; Takeuchi 1963: 43-44; Saeki 1973: 
214; Matsumoto 1961: 87-98; Hiraishi 1994: 279-282]. For instance, “Asia is one,” stated at the opening of 
Okakura’s Ideals of the East, was frequently quoted and had enormous infl uence as an ideological incli-
nation appealing for Asian civilization, unity, and identity, while demonstrating the principles that all 
Asians shared. Okakura [1903: 1] mentioned in his book, “Th e Himalayas divide, only to accentuate, two 
mighty civilizations, the Chinese with its communism of Confucius, and the Indian with its individual-
ism of the Vedas.” But, he added, this geographical divide has not “interrupted” a common inheritance 
marked by a “love for the Ultimate and Universal.” It was precisely this shared disposition for the ultimate 
and universal that had enabled Asians everywhere to produce the great religions of the world and to 
emphasize the ends, not the means, of life that distinguished the maritime civilizations of the West. 
Th e originality of Okakura rested rather on his suggestion of an entirely new way for Asia to overcome 
identity crisis. He wanted Asia to apply a fundamentally diff erent way beyond any tangible material mea-
surements. Okakura preached that Asia could achieve the goal of self-awareness and external recognition 
by asserting itself as non-materialist entity, which was comparable, even aesthetically and morally supe-
rior to, the civilization of the West. Indeed, he found in the world of high culture a possibility of creating 
a common identity among Asians, and perhaps even more crucially, of gaining what they believed to be a 
deserved recognition from the West, that Asia was a civilization par excellence. In other words, he enun-
ciated his belief that Asia was quite capable of resisting the temptation of being further “civilized” in the 
Western sense because Asia was, and always had been, a civilization on a par with Europe. He aspired to 
recognition without specifi cally calling for the achievement of material parity with the West, even much 
less achieving it by military means [Hotta 2007: 31-34].
5.2. Enigmatic Pan-Asianism
　　Most of the Japanese of the Meiji period were more preoccupied with developments in the West than 
in Asia, concluding that the only possible course for a modern Japan was to try to join the imperialist 
club and to escape itself from Asia. Th e Meiji government, therefore, opted not to invoke Pan-Asianism as 
a main ideology of its foreign policy. Th is was clearly displayed in the prevalence of the notion of West-
ernization and escape from Asia, which was popularized by the prominent writer and educator Fukuzawa 
Yukichi. Th e Pan-Asianism remained very much a minority concern by comparison with the strongly 
entrenched idea of Westernization and escape from Asia. However, the notion of Westernization and 
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escape from Asia in no way altered the conviction of the number of Pan-Asianists that Asian heritage, 
culture, and values not only had greater validity for them but also was infinitely superior to Western 
value-institutional systems. Rather it provoked Japanese intellectuals to revisit Asia to resolve identity 
crisis. It was in the light of such identity crisis that Pan-Asianism became increasingly an attractive ideol-
ogy for many Japanese. Th erefore, Pan-Asianism had never been isolated, and, aft er World War I and the 
advent of Taishō democracy, rather became relevant to the political arena in which they were constantly 
absorbed by politics and politicians, adjusted to suit political needs, and manipulated and exploited by 
various political actors. But, unfortunately, during these processes of transmission into politics, Pan-
Asianism was surely changed, challenged, and preempted by a style of narrow nationalist sentiment that 
was more conservative and exclusive than the early and romantic Pan-Asianists had ever been. 
　　In the background of the critical change throughout the dissemination into politics, a variety of 
proximate factors were involved. Among them was social and ideological condition in the domestic level 
of Japan; so called, the socialism and its movement. Socialism, not only alien in its origin for Japanese but 
also more radical in its tendency of seeking for the rejection of pre-modern traditions and institutions 
than modernism in Meiji era, had much impact on the identity of Japanese in Taisho and early Showa era 
and gave rise to many mental as well as physical reactions. Other key factor was Japan’s embarrassing 
experiences and uncertainties in the international level. For example, having moved against German pos-
session in China during World War I, Japan was with great pleasure payed back with a seat as one of the 
‘Big Five’ powers at the Paris Peace Conference (1919). But Japan came out of that conference with deep 
discontentment. In particular, disturbing of Japan was the vain debate to include the clauses guarantee-
ing racial equality and religious freedom [Hotta, 2007: 68-71]. In addition, more strain was put on rela-
tions between Japan and the United States, when the US anti-Japanese Immigration Act went into eff ect 
on 1 July 1924. Th e reaction from Japan was strong and widespread. What was humiliating for the Japa-
nese elite was that the Japanese continued to face discrimination on the basis of their identifi cation with 
the yellow race and Asian culture and Japan was hypocritically excluded from the Eurocentric interna-
tional order in the context of the permanent racial and civilizational superiority of the West over yellow 
race in spite of Japan’s civilized status and proven record of Westernization [Hirobe 2001].
　　Th e above-mentioned condition and experiences had a huge impact on the psychology of Japanese 
elites. At last, Pan-Asianism was employed and adopted by bureaucrats and political organizations with 
mostly right-wing political tendencies. For example, the type of anti-Western, anti-imperialis thought 
that penetrated Okakura’s work such as Th e Awakening of the East was seen as useful by Japanese ultra-
nationalists who saw in it a rationalization for Japan’s aggressive policy in Asia, considering Japan as 
fi ghting for Asian and against the West. At last, by the end of the 1930s, while espousing similar principles 
of interventionism and expansionism, Pan-Asianism turned into a means to justify Japanese imperial-
ism, enjoyed the legitimacy of a viable political construct within Japan, and became an integral part of 
Japanese identity. Pan-Asianism culminated in the concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, launched in 1940 on the eve of the invasion of Southeast Asia [Peattie 1984: 21-22; Jansen 1965: 75; 
Pyle 1969: 185-187; Saaler 2007: 14-15; Hotta, 2007: 62; Notehelfer 1990: 331; Narangoa and Cribb, 2003: 
16-17; McCormack 2001: 166; Takeuchi 1963: 59-62; Oka 1961: 74-77; Maruyama 1964: 57]. In a nutshell, the 
Pan-Asianists’ original ideals, which can be viewed as an idealistic and mostly cultural regionalism based 
on cultural common Asian identity, was in the end dismayed by the growth of militarism and jingoism in 
Japan and were distorted and used for the aims of the militaristic Japanese state.
5.3. Pan-Asianists’ Ambiguous Identity 
　　Pan-Asianism became central to the Japanese construction of the new Asian identity, premising a 
regional identity as Asians upon the distinction between Asia and the West. Th is kind of regional identity 
arose as a reaction to identity crisis posed by Westernization and escape from Asia. Furthermore, when 
exposed to aggressive expansionist threat from the West as well as obsession with Westernization and 
attempt to escape from Asia, Pan-Asianists were motivated by their communal identity as Asian, believ-
ing they should work together for the common goal of regional identity and unity. But as a matter of fact, 
Pan-Asianism tended to be ambivalent about a regional identity and unity. This was due, on the one 
hand, to a need to construct a regional Asian identity as a response to the Westernization and escape 
from Asia and, on the other hand, to a tendency for Japan to claim leadership and supremacy in Asia. 
Pan-Asianists identified the Japanese identity with that of Asia, but they also held that Japan was to 
inherit its identity from Asia, to develop it, and to champion it in Asia. In other words, since Asia was 
weak, they concurred that something had to be done about it and that it ultimately had to be done by 
Japan, who was in a relatively better-off  position than the rest, proclaiming Japan’s special mission to lead 
and protect East Asia [Hotta, 2007: 49; Muto, 2001: 173; Aydin, 2007: 76].
　　Indeed, Pan-Asianists were interested fi rst and foremost in the identity of Japan, and implicitly pos-
sessed the assumption of Japanese superiority in all spiritual, cultural, and material spheres over other 
Asian nations. Th us even members of Seikyosha and Okakura did not hesitate to extol Japan’s superior 
perspective over other Asian nations. Miyake, Shiga, and Kuga, for instance, called for Japanese expan-
sion into the surrounding world through a cultural mission designed to convince others of Japan’s cul-
tural genius [Notehelfer 1990: 329]. It would be far-fetched to say that even Okakura’s all-embracing art 
historical, philosophical incarnation was an ideology dissociated from Japan’s exclusive national identity. 
Okakura pictured Japan as the leader of Asian resistance and, in essence, the living “museum” or spiritual 
“repository” of Asia as well. It was as if the incomplete spiritual components of Asia had achieved a higher 
Hegelian synthesis in Japan. Okakura mentioned, “Japan is a museum of Asiatic civilization; and yet 
more than a museum because the singular genius of the race leads it to dwell on all phases of the ideals of 
the past, in the spirit of living Adwaitism which welcomes the new without losing the old” [Okakura 1903: 
7-8]. What most of Pan-Asianists shared, therefore, was their identifi cation with the nation, the concept 
of a national mission, and the further conviction that Japan’s identity was about to burst forth into the 
broader world. Th us, identity, superiority and mission of Japan appeared to be the integral parts of Pan-
Asianists [Notehelfer 1990: 311, 329]. 
　　Whereas Pan-Asianism served as the foundation for the necessity of the regional identity, it seemed 
to legitimize or even to call for a Japanese leadership and cultural mission in Asia. Over time, Japanese 
ultra-national identity prevailed, and proclamation of Asian brotherhood was turned into slogans to jus-
tify Japanese aggression in Asia. Furthermore, ironically, Japanese Pan-Asianist search for a regional 
identity, while clinging increasingly to their national unique identity and mission in Asia, had the general 
eff ect of feeding the fi res of national identities in Asia rather than encouraging to create a regional iden-
tity [Peattie 1984: 24-25, 38-43].
6. Conclusion
　　It may be appropriate to conclude this article with a few over-all considerations which bear on crisis 
of identify in Japan’s modern and contemporary epoch. Let me set forth briefl y some of the salient points 
suggested in this article:
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　　Firstly, throughout the modern Japanese history, Japan in the formation of identity has been engaged 
in a great pendulum-like swing away from and toward Asia, a movement interactive with specifi c ideo-
logical trend. In its reactions to the West, Japan followed the historic stages characteristic of extremes of 
“obsession and rejection” and failure of “reconciliation.” As we have seen above, for example, there was 
much oscillation between the West and Asia. Th e Meiji period of extensive Westernization and escape 
from Asia was followed by period of “reentry into Asia” during which obsession, humiliation, fear, frus-
tration, and insecurity having led to identity crisis were dealt with and Japan put gradually emphasis on 
its pursuit of Pan-Asianism. More specifi cally speaking, during the industrial and social revolutions that 
followed the Meiji Restoration, Japanese leaders spoke confi dently of “escaping from Asia” and “entering 
Europe” but this pattern was reversed in the twentieth century. Now leaders urged a “reentry into Asia” 
and an “abandonment of Europe.” Th is situation, however, led to a decrease in the feeling of closeness on 
the part of Japan’s supporters of “datsuaron” towards the West on the one hand, and Pan-Asianists in 
Japan lost their feelings of solidarity towards Asia on the other hand. Th is constellation brought about by 
the special dynamics of “escape from Asia” and “reentry into Asia” has been at the origin of today’s Japa-
nese identity crisis. Torn between the idealized poles of the West and Asia, the Japanese search for their 
identity has been an elusive aff air and this pendulum-like oscillation has led to Japan’s political, social, 
and cultural isolation in Asia.
　　Secondly, the experiences of the Meiji Japan demonstrate the type of logical relationship between 
identity crisis and ideology that tends to accompany the identifi cation process. Th e greater part of the 
Meiji governmental establishment concluded that the only possible course for survival of Japan was to try 
to westernize itself in Western imagination and to join the West and distance itself from Asia. Th e Japa-
nese Westernization and escape from Asia seemed to be successful in creating an efficient centralized 
government and developing a modern economy and a strong army. Parallel to these achievements pro-
duced by Japanese Westernization and escape from Asia, however, the Japanese faced fundamental ques-
tions about their identity, Japan’s relationship with its neighbors, and the limits of Japanese Westerniza-
tion. It can be said that the extremes of attraction to Westernization and escape from Asia were related 
psychological phenomena, that is to say, identity crisis, because those experiences led to the uncertainty, 
confusion, frustration, humiliation, and fear etc. Th e Meiji intellectuals attempted naturally to respond 
to identity crisis by producing Pan-Asianism which had played a dynamic and creative role in resolving 
identity crisis. Th erefore, Pan-Asianism was fostered in response to identity crisis, while it grew in close 
association with the Meiji Japan’s identity crisis. But, the original value and orientation of Pan-Asianism 
were misused most forcefully by imperial Japan. Th e original ideals of same race and same culture against 
imperialism changed very much when they were put to use. Th e Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere 
based on Pan-Asianism was little more than an “organized hypocrisy” [Krasner 2000: 66]. Japan was just 
as imperialist as the European.
　　After a relatively brief and particle experimentation, therefore, early Pan-Asianism seemed ulti-
mately to fail to provide the structure for the next greater form of identifi cation so as to resolve identity 
crisis. In other words, Pan-Asianists appeared to have failed to lock their identity in a reconstructed iden-
tity̶harmonious, humane, compassionate, tolerant, and cosmopolitan̶by linking their identity to 
Asia. There seemed to be lacking a generally accepted framework of universal values on which Pan-
Asianists could base their arguments. According to Maruyama’s perspective comment [Quoted in Jansen, 
1965: 81], the failure to develop transcendental ideals of Japan and the poverty and limitations of Pan-
Asianism made it easy to promote, and combine with, the ideologies of family state and divine nation. 
Just the thought and behavior of most Pan-Asianists refl ected the ongoing process of Japanese identity 
crisis. Identity crisis appeared almost ceaselessly to emerge no better off with the jolting experiences. 
Furthermore, the subversion and degradation of the Pan-Asianism of the Meiji period lead for the part of 
neighbor countries to be skeptical about the prospects for even today’s Japanese expressions of Asianism 
[McCormack, 2001: 166].
　　Thirdly, from Meiji to contemporary Japan, one conspicuous feature of the Japanese scene in the 
cycle of the formation of identify is the prevalence of a discussion carried on in terms of self-awareness 
and self-identifi cation. In other words, Japan passed through crises of identity in the periods of the Meiji 
and war, but the general syndrome of having to synthesize social realities and needs with psychological 
realities and needs has been present in all history from post-war period to this day. The awareness of 
being diff erent, of facing discontinuities of unique proportions, of suff ering, and of agony̶that is to say, 
identity crisis̶seems to be constant in much of Japan’s history. Th erefore, it is necessary to have a more 
subtle and broadly-based understanding of the dynamics of change and interrelationship between iden-
tity crisis and ideology over a period of time. What is needed is to make sure whether or not aspect of the 
Meiji Japan’s experience with identity crisis and ideology can fi nd parallels in the experiences of contem-
porary periods. 
　　Postwar Japan’s identity crisis, for instance, mainly stems from defeat in the Pacifi c War and U.S. 
occupation. Japan’s unconditional surrender to the United States and American occupation are the sig-
nificant sources of postwar Japanese identity crisis. Indeed, the postwar era has been an era in which 
Japan has been forced to embrace America as the dominant model. Model which Japan has been com-
pelled to seek out is identified with concrete characteristics of America. Japan, therefore, resumed an 
even more thoroughgoing Westernizing path, that is, Americanization. Postwar Japanese identity crisis 
has been bound by its images of America which have provoked in the Japanese the feelings of “shame and 
envy” [Tamamoto, 2003: 205]. Most Japanese thinkers are agreed that Japan lacks shutaisei. Caught 
between Asia and America as model of shutaisei, Japanese thought on identity fl oundered, unable to rec-
oncile the two. Miyoshi Masao [Quoted in Tamamoto, 2003: 204-5], a Japanese-born naturalized Ameri-
can arid literary critic, off ers clarifi cation: “Th e uncritical pursuit of shutaisei in Japan may be still one 
more example of Japan’s gestures toward Westernization, and thus ironically proof of its lack of shuta-
isei.” In the postwar world, as a result, Japan has to continue defi ning and redefi ning its identity, experi-
encing relentless identity crisis.
　　Against this identity crisis, Japanese leaders including Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru provided 
their country-men with “economism”: an ideology of Japan as a “merchant nation” (shonin kokka)̶a 
country that institutionalized a national consensus on economic growth while concentrating on eco-
nomic development and eschewing the pursuit of military power. With this economism, Japanese leaders 
believed that identity crisis could be resolved when Japanese economy based on advanced technology, 
permanent employment, industrious labors, and well-built middle class, become world prosperous and 
competitive. In addition, Yoshida attempted to subvert the Left ’s pacifi sm: an ideology of Japan as a “peace 
nation,” a nation dedicated to the pacifi st ideals of the Japanese constitution [Berger 1996: 336-343; Kat-
zenstein 1998: 30]. As a consequence, notably since the early 1960s, Japan at large had become increasingly 
associated with material culture, instant pleasure, the production and consumption of things, concen-
trating energies on the areas in which it enjoyed a comparative advantage: trade, technology, and eco-
nomic growth. In the 1980s, at last, Japan’s nominal per capita gross national product surpassed that of 
most of the West including America. As Japan’s own ascendance in the world economy boosted national 
confi dence, Japan appeared to be able to identify, aft er a long time and successfully, itself as a member of 
the “G-7,” allowing it to assume a rightful place in a club whose members share the world’s highest per 
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capita incomes. This identification, therefore, seemed to allow Japan to free itself from never-ending 
identity crisis [Tamamoto 2003: 209]. 
　　Yet, the end of the Cold War, the emergence of a post-modern state, the globalizing world, and the 
lost decades open to new questions of identity of Japanese. Firstly, as British diplomat Robert Cooper in 
his book The Breaking of Nations describes Japan as a ‘post-modern’ state or the post-Westphalian 
nation-state, Japan is more closely resembling the states in the EU which submit deliberately sovereign 
rights to regional/international norms and rule and attempt to soften national identity: “It has self-
imposed limits on defense spending and capabilities. It is no longer interested in acquiring territory nor 
in using force. It would probably be willing to accept intrusive verifi cation. It is an enthusiastic multilat-
eralist” [Cooper 2003: 41]. But unfortunately Japan, surrounded by ‘modern’ states including a rising 
China which provoke willingly their national identity, is experiencing identity crisis or ambiguity 
between modern identity and post-modern identity. Secondly, the globalizing world and the lost decades 
make it more and more diffi  cult to discuss Japanese identity only within the framework of nation-state. 
Many of younger Japanese today, for instance, are not at all interested in what Japan is as a nation, nor 
what kinds of role their county has to play in the world or regional community. It seems that as its domes-
tic sluggishness is being proliferated along with the decline of secure job opportunity and the increasing 
sense of alienation among Japanese, so-called disconnected society (muen syakai), young Japanese are 
failing to seek for their sense of identity in local/national/regional/global community.
　　Finally, an identity formation, as Erikson points out, is a procedure of uninterrupted crisis and reso-
lution from early childhood through youth and adult to the elderly. Naito Konan who was best known as 
a founder of the Kyoto School of Sinology as well as a new member in the Seikyosha in November 1890, 
also argues that the life of a nation is largely similar to the life of a man. It is seldom realized that behind 
Naito’s achievement lay the several years in the Seikyosha. Like many of his contemporaries, Naito was 
plagued by the contemporary problem of having to fi nd Japanese as well as regional Asian identity in this 
time of identity crisis. Naito held that just as Chinese civilization could be born, mature, and decline, so 
could Japan’s, and the evolution of the two organisms was joined through the shift  of the Oriental cul-
tural centre from China to Japan, which was inevitable. Naito [Quoted in Tam 1977: 206] argued:
  Th e diff erence between China and Japan today comes from their diff erent stages in this life. However, 
had Japan lived through the age of China, Japan would be another China, and China would be another 
Japan had the reverse been also true.
　　Ironically and interestingly enough, indeed, the distinction between China and Japan, as Naito 
points out, originates in their dissimilar phases in the history. Japan had fl owered between 1870 and 1930 
in an era of state-building, and between 1960 and 1980 in a period of the economic boom. However, 
China bore the mark of state-collapse between 1870 and 1930 and the political disturbance between 1960 
and 1980. Japan had become strong because she was in a diff erent developmental stage in her history from 
that of China. Comparing Japan and China today, it is obvious that China is rising as Japan is in decline 
politically and economically. Indeed, Japan seemed, fi nally, to be part of the West, removing its constant 
source of identity crisis. However, as soon as Japan arrived at its goal and seemed to resolve its identity, 
Japan lost its way. Japan seems to have the future, but it does not seem to have the image of future. Th e 
simple fact is that Japan is old, mature, sophisticated and, not sure but maybe, close to the end of its glori-
ous and sublime history, while China is young, unsophisticated, and has just started its new era. The 
Asian cultural centre has been shift ing again from Japan to China. Japanese civilization has been born 
and mature and will be decline, just as China has been, as Naito mentions.
　　It is obvious that today’s Japan is, and will be, far from being at the end of history. Japan may be on 
the threshold of the end of the era of Japanese glory. It certainly appears that Japanese glory has been 
challenged. Its glory is being neutralized by its neighbors, its economic power is progressively being 
weakened, the utility and appeal of Japanese working ethics and values ebb, and its internal disturbances 
are increasing beside the aged issue and the soaring feeling of isolation between Japanese. Th e tremen-
dous eff ort, ambition, success, expansion, total defeat, recovery, and prosperity of the late 19th and 20 
centuries have left  Japan fatigued and exhausted. Twenty-fi rst century Japanese seem to become less con-
fi dent than their nineteenth and twentieth century ancestor had been.  
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